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DICINTIO V. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. I
(decided February 13, 2002; reargument denied, April 30, 2002)
I. SYNOPSIS
The New York Court of Appeals, in a unanimous ruling, re-
versed the order of the appellate division 2 and dismissed the first
three causes of action of the complaint, and answered the certified
question, "whether the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ... applies to
plaintiff ['s] .. .automobile lease,' 3 in the negative.
4
II. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff leased a sport utility vehicle, manufactured by
DaimlerChrysler Corporation ("Daimler"), from Adzam Auto Sales,
Inc. ("Adzam") in June of 1999.5 Adzam assigned the lease to a
"Holder," Chrysler Financial Company L.L.C. The plaintiff never
obtained title to the vehicle. 6 The vehicle came with limited war-
ranties in addition to warranties that "arise by operation of law."
7
The basic warranty provided for "the cost of all parts and labor nec-
essary to repair any defective item .. .except [the] tires" and the
additional warranties covered the "cost of repairing corrosion to
the vehicle and bringing it into compliance with government emis-
sion standards."8 The warranties did not distinguish between "war-
ranties for buyers and warranties for lessees." 9 The cost of the
vehicle and the payment schedule agreed upon was as follows:
The agreed-upon value or "gross capital cost" of the vehi-
cle was $32,349. DiCintio paid an initial "capitalized cost
reduction" of $2,547-fees, taxes and first monthly pay-
ment brought his initial outlay to $4,179-and agreed to
1. 97 N.Y.2d 463 (2002).
2. DiCintio v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 724 N.Y.S.2d 717 (App. Div. 2001).
3. DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 466.
4. Id. at 475.
5. Id. at 466.
6. Id. at 467.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 467.
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make monthly payments of $390 for 36 months. Of the
$14,039 thus due in monthly payments, $9,736 reflected
depreciation, while the lease classified the balance as
rent. At the close of the 36-month lease period, having
paid some $16,586 plus taxes and fees, DiCintio had the
option to purchase the vehicle by paying an additional
$20,561. If he returned the vehicle to Adzam before the
end of the lease term, he would owe all remaining
monthly payments, less the unearned rent charge for the
remaining months, plus any excess mileage and excess
wear and use charges. 10
Shortly after the plaintiff received the vehicle, he experienced
multiple problems: (1) the transmission did not work correctly; (2)
the vehicle pulled to the left while driven; and (3) it experienced
idling problems and stalled while at traffic lights. Despite taking
the vehicle to six or seven authorized dealers for repairs, the vehicle
still manifested these problems. The plaintiff informed Adzam that
he wanted to be issued another car or he would terminate the lease.
Adzam declined to issue a new car, whereby the plaintiff informed
Daimler that he was revoking acceptance of the vehicle. The plain-
tiff did not, however, inform Adzam that he was revoking accept-
ance of the vehicle. 1 The plaintiff commenced an action in
response to Daimler's refusal to accept his revocation. 12
Plaintiff alleged five causes of action: (1) breach of written war-
ranty against Daimler under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act1 3
("Warranty Act"); (2) breach of implied warranty against defen-
dants under the Warranty Act and N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-318; (3)
revocation of acceptance against defendants under the Warranty
Act; (4) costs, fees, and expenses against defendants under the War-
ranty Act; and (5) improper delivery against defendants under N.Y.
U.C.C. § 2-601.14
Defendants Adzam and Daimler Corp. moved to dismiss the
complaint.15 The New York Supreme Court denied the defendants'
10. DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 467.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (McKinney 2002).
14. DiCintio v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 713 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
15. Id. at 810.
[Vol. 47
CASE COMPILATION
motion to dismiss the first cause of action and held that the War-
ranty Act was designed to protect "the public interest against manu-
facturer's abuses by enforcing warranties on consumer products
regardless of whether an individual is a lessee or a consumer." Fur-
ther, the court held that the Warranty Act was applicable to the
plaintiff, despite the fact that plaintiff's lease provided him with an
option to buy at the end of the leasing agreement.1 6 Also, the court
denied defendant Adzam's motion to dismiss the second cause of
action and held that where privity of contract exists, New York rec-
ognizes a claim for breach of implied warranty when economic
losses are claimed. 17 For the same reason, the court granted defen-
dant Daimler's motion to dismiss the second and third causes of
action because there was no privity of contract. Further, the court
granted defendant Adzam's motion to dismiss the third cause of
action, because plaintiff "failed to allege that he notified Adzam of
his intent to revoke his prior acceptance of the car," citing N.Y.
U.C.C. § 2-608(2).18 As to the fourth cause of action, the court de-
nied the defendants' motion because the Warranty Act "permits a
prevailing party to recover costs and expenses, including attorneys'
fees."1 9 Finally, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss
the fifth cause of action. 20 Citing N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 2-711 and 2-713,2
1
the court held that "the only remedies available for improper deliv-
ery are against the seller," thus precluding a cause of action against
Daimler. 22 Furthermore, the court held that according to N.Y.
U.C.C. § 2-602(1),2 3 for plaintiff to have properly rejected the vehi-
cle, he must have notified the seller, which plaintiff did not.
On appeal by both parties to the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, First Department, the court affirmed the denial
of the motion to dismiss as to the first cause of action, holding that
the lease entered into, which resembled an ownership interest and
had an option to purchase the vehicle at the lease's conclusion, suf-
16. DiCintio, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-608(2) (McKinney 2002)).
19. DiCintio, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
20. Id. at 813.
21. N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 2-711, 2-713 (McKinney 2002).
22. DiCintio, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 812-13.
23. N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 2-711, 2-713 (McKinney 2002).
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ficiently resembled a sale to place the plaintiff under the protection
of the Warranty Act.24 The court also affirmed the denial of defen-
dant Adzam's motion as to the second cause of action because priv-
ity of contract existed between plaintiff and Adzam. 25 However, the
court reversed the granting of defendant Daimler's motion to dis-
miss the second cause of action. In doing so, the court ruled that
privity could exist between plaintiff and Daimler to sustain a cause
of action for implied warranty if Adzam was found to have been a
sales or leasing agent of Daimler, and that dismissal was premature
as discovery would be needed to determine whether privity ex-
isted. 26 In addition, the court reversed the granting of defendants'
motion to dismiss the third cause of action, and ruled that the rem-
edy of revocation does not require privity for a breach of an express
warranty. Moreover, even though privity would be required to sus-
tain a breach of an implied warranty, discovery would be necessary
to determine if such privity existed. 27 Finally, the court reversed
the denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss the fourth cause of
action, holding that "an award of costs, fees and expenses under 15
USC § 2310(d)(2) . . . does not allege an actionable wrong to be
separately sued for but simply amounts to a prayer for relief redun-
dant of the complaint's general demand for relief."
28
On appeal by defendants and upon the appellate division certi-
fying the appeal for review, the court of appeals dismissed the plain-
tiff's first three causes of action and answered the certified question
on appeal, "whether the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ... applies
to plaintiff ['s] ... automobile lease," 29 in the negative, thus revers-
ing the appellate division's ruling.
III. DIscussIoN
The issue on appeal to the New York State Court of Appeals
was "whether the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ... applies to plain-
tiff ['s] . . . automobile lease. °30 To determine whether the plain-
24. DiCintio, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
25. Id. at 718.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 718-19.




tiff's lease fell under the protection of the Warranty Act, the court
addressed the purpose of the Warranty Act and whom it serves to
protect. The Warranty Act was a response to complaints from auto-
mobile owners who claimed that automobile dealerships and manu-
facturers were not honoring their warranties on the vehicles.31 The
court noted that the Warranty Act is driven by disclosure, with the
purpose of "improv[ing] the adequacy of information available to
consumers, prevent[ing] deception, and improv[ing] competition
in the marketing of consumer products. '3 2 The Warranty Act does
not require the issuance of warranties, however, if manufacturers or
dealerships decide to issue warranties, they must comply with the
requirements of the Warranty Act, including disclosure require-
ments. 33 Namely, "any warrantor warranting a consumer product
to a consumer by means of a written warranty shall . . . disclose in
simple and readily understood language the terms and conditions
of such warranty." 34 Furthermore, the Warranty Act "provides that
'to meet the Federal minimum standards for warranty' a warrantor
'must as a minimum remedy such consumer product within a rea-
sonable time and without charge, in the case of a defect, malfunc-
tion, or failure to conform with such written warranty' and that, if
the warrantor's repair attempts do not remedy the defects reasona-
bly promptly, the warrantor must provide a refund or replace-
ment."35 If a consumer is damaged due to noncompliance with the
Warranty Act, the consumer can "sue warrantors for damages and
other relief."
The court focused on the language of the statute, specifically,
"consumer,"36 "written warranty,"37 and "implied warranty. '38 The
31. DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 468.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (2002)).
35. Id. at 468-69 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1),(4) (2002)).
36. The term "consumer" means a buyer (other than for purposes of resale) of
any consumer product, any person to whom such product is transferred during the
duration of an implied or written warranty (or service contract) applicable to the prod-
uct, and any other person who is entitled by the terms of such warranty (or service
contract) or under applicable State law to enforce against the warrantor (or service
contractor) the obligations of the warranty (or service contract). 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (3)
(2002).
37. The term "written warranty" means: (A) any written affirmation of fact or writ-
ten promise made in connection with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a
20033
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Warranty Act requires a plaintiff to be a "consumer."39 The defini-
tion of consumer delineates three tests to determine a "consumer"
(a rightful plaintiff under the Warranty Act) .40 The first test within
the definition of "consumer" requires that "a buyer" exist, which
"directly raises the question whether a sale has occurred. '41 The
second and third tests assume a "sale" has taken place, because they
require that a written or implied warranty must exist. Similarly,
both written and implied warranties, also defined in the Warranty
Act, require a sale to have occurred. 42 Thus, the court highlighted
that to determine whether a plaintiff is a "consumer" requires the
determination of whether a "sale" occurred, because every defini-
tion of "consumer" incorporates the necessity of a sale. Therefore,
the "case hinges on whether [the plaintiffs] lease qualifies as a
'sale.' "4
The plaintiff raised three arguments as to why the Warranty
Act should apply to him: (1) his lease was a sale; (2) alternatively, if
it is not a sale, the Warranty Act should still apply because a sale
occurred between Chrysler Financial Company L.L.C. and Adzam;
and (3) he is entitled to enforce the obligations of the warranty. 44
In response to the plaintiffs first argument, the court analyzed
the plain language of the Warranty Act.45 Noting that the terms
buyer which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or
promises that such material or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level
of performance over a specified period of time, or (B) any undertaking in writing in
connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product to refund, repair, replace,
or take other remedial action with respect to such product in the event that such prod-
uct fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking, which written affirma-
tion, promise, or undertaking becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a
supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of such product. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2301(6) (2002).
38. DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 469. The term "implied warranty" means an implied
warranty arising under State law (as modified by sections 2308 and 2304(a) of this title)
in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7)
(2002).
39. DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 469.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 469-70. The operative language in the statute requiring a sale in the
definitions of a "written warranty" and "implied warranty" is "in connection with the
sale." Id.
43. Id. at 470.
44. DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 471-74.
45. Id. at 470-71.
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"sale" or "buyer" are not contained in the Warranty Act, the court
turned to the U.C.C. law of sales.46 The Uniform Commercial
Code requires passing of title for a sale to occur.47 Passing of title
under the U.C.C. is not a component of a lease, nor part of a lease
in the preceding common law before the enactment of the U.C.C.
48
The court concluded that because the plaintiff never received title
to the vehicle (due the plaintiff having a lease), no sale occurred
according to the U.C.C., and without a sale, the plaintiff cannot be
a "consumer."49 Although the appellate division ruled that the
lease sufficiently resembled a sale to satisfy the Warranty Act, and
that the plaintiff argued that his lease resembled an installment sale
because of the option to buy, the court differentiated the plaintiff
from a buyer in stating that a lessee is "free not to exercise the op-
tion to buy," that buying the same vehicle would cost almost three
times more per month, and that lessees enjoy less rights than
buyers.5
0
To further demonstrate that the Warranty Act excludes leases,
the court compared the Warranty Act with the Truth in Lending
Act, 5 1 ("TILA"), a precursor bill52 to the Warranty Act, and to the
New Car Lemon Law, (the "Lemon Law") .5  TILA was enacted
seven years prior to the Warranty Act and defines "consumer lease"
in a manner that the court concluded would likely encompass the
46. DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 470.
47. Id. "A 'sale' consists in the passing of tile from the seller to the buyer for a
price (Section 2-401)." U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (2002). " ' Buyer' means a person who buys or
contracts to buy goods." U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a) (2002).
48. DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 470-471. "'Consumer lease' means a lease that a lessor
regularly engaged in the business of leasing or selling makes to a lessee, except an
organization, who is an individual and who takes under the lease primarily for a per-
sonal, family, or household purpose, if the total payments to be made under the lease
contract, excluding payments for options to renew or buy, do not exceed $25,000."
U.C.C. §2A-103(1) (e) (2002). "'Lease' means a transfer of the right to possession and
use of goods for a term in return for consideration, but a sale, including a sale on
approval or a sale or return, or retention or creation of a security interest is not a lease.
Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term includes a sublease." U.C.C.
§2A-103(1) (j) (2002).
49. DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 471.
50. Id.
51. 15 U.S.C. §1601 (2002).
52. H.R. CONF. REP. 93-20 (1973).
53. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §198-a (McKinney 2002).
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plaintiffs lease. 54 Clearly, Congress was aware of the trend in leas-
ing vehicles and "knew how to draft consumer protection statutes
that cover leases and opted not to include such protection in the
Warranty Act."55 Additionally, hearings in the House of Represent-
atives for a precursor bill of the Warranty Act reveal that advice
56
was given to include leases in the Warranty Act, but that Congress
made a policy choice not to include leases in the definition of "con-
sumer."57 Finally, to further illustrate the purposeful exclusion of
leases from the Warranty Act, the court compared the New York
Lemon Law to the Warranty Act. 58 In 1986, the definition of "con-
sumer," in the Lemon Law, which was substantially similar to the
definition in the Warranty Act, was amended to include lessees.
59
The court noted that the legislative history of the Lemon Law delin-
eates that without the amendment of "consumer," lessees would not
be covered under the Lemon Law, which further demonstrates that
legislatures "can expand consumer protection laws to cover leases
when they wish."
60
The plaintiff's second argument was that even if the lease is not
a sale, the Warranty Act should still apply because the lease states
that a sale occurred (or would occur) between Chrysler Financial
Company L.L.C. and Adzam, thus creating a written warranty. The
court gave two reasons why the plaintiffs argument failed.61 The
court stated that the lease provides for a sale to occur between
Chrysler Financial Company L.L.C. and Adzam after the execution
of the lease. 62 The plaintiff would no longer be in the lease agree-
ment if the sale occurred. Second, the court questioned if the writ-
ten warranty would even "'become part of the basis of the bargain
54. DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 471.
55. Id.
56. The suggested terminology that was advised to be included in the Warranty
Act but was ultimately not included was "first buyer or lessee of a consumer retail prod-
uct." DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 473 (citing Consumer Warranty Protection - 1973: Hearings
on H.R. 20 and H.R. 5021 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., at 95 (1973)).
57. DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 472-73.
58. Id. at 473.
59. Id.
60. Id. 473-4.




between a supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale'
when the vehicle is sold to" Chrysler Financial Company L.L.C.,
which is part of the definition of a written warranty.
63
Plaintiffs third argument that he is "a person who is entitled by
the terms of such warranty. .. to enforce against the warrantor...
the obligations of the warranty" under the definition of "consumer"
in the Warranty Act was dismissed by the court since both types of
warranties, written or implied, require the existence of a "sale."
64
IV. CONCLUSION
The court of appeals dismissed the plaintiffs first three causes
of action and answered the certified question on appeal, "whether
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act . . . applies to plaintiffl['s] . . .
automobile lease,' 65 in the negative, thus reversing the appellate
division's ruling. Although having his initial five causes of action
dismissed throughout the judicial process, the plaintiff amended
his complaint and included additional claims under the Lemon
Law and the U.C.C. Article 2-A, which Daimler answered.
Joshua T. Coleman
63. DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 474.
64. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (3) (2002)).
65. Id. at 466.
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